Evidence from a Lab in the Field Experiment with Coffee Farmers in Costa Rica by Naranjo, Maria Angelica et al.
                                           
Environment for Development 
 Discussion Paper Series  March 2017        EfD DP 17-04  
 
 
Credit, Insurance, and 
Farmers’ Liability 
Evidence from a Lab in the Field Experiment  
with Coffee Farmers in Costa Rica 
 
 
Mar ia  Angel i ca  Nar an jo ,  Janneke  P ie ter s ,  and  Franc i sco  Al p íz ar   
  
Environment for Development Centers 
 
The Environment for Development (EfD) initiative is an environmental economics program focused on international 
research collaboration, policy advice, and academic training. Financial support is provided by the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Learn more at www.efdinitiative.org or contact info@efdinitiative.org.  
    
 
Central America  
Research Program in Economics and 
Environment for Development in Central 
America Tropical Agricultural Research and 
Higher Education Center (CATIE) 
 
 
 
 
Chile 
Research Nucleus on Environmental and 
Natural Resource Economics (NENRE)  
Universidad de Concepción 
 
 
 
China  
Environmental Economics Program in China 
(EEPC) 
Peking University  
 
 
 
 
 
Colombia 
The Research Group on Environmental, 
Natural Resource and Applied Economics 
Studies (REES-CEDE), Universidad de los 
Andes, Colombia 
 
 
 
Ethiopia  
Environment and Climate Research Center 
(ECRC) 
Ethiopian Development Research Institute 
(EDRI) 
 
 
 
 
 
India 
Centre for Research on the Economics of 
Climate, Food, Energy, and Environment, 
(CECFEE), at Indian Statistical Institute, New 
Delhi, India 
 
 
 
 
Kenya 
School of Economics 
University of Nairobi 
 
 
 
 
South Africa  
Environmental Economics Policy Research 
Unit (EPRU) 
University of Cape Town 
 
 
 
Sweden 
Environmental Economics Unit 
University of Gothenburg 
 
 
 
 
Tanzania  
Environment for Development Tanzania 
University of Dar es Salaam  
 
 
 
 
 
 
USA (Washington, DC) 
Resources for the Future (RFF) 
 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam 
University of Economics  
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 
 
 
Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have 
not necessarily undergone formal peer review. 
 
 
 
Credit, Insurance and Farmers’ Liability: Evidence from a Lab in the 
Field Experiment with Coffee Farmers in Costa Rica 
Maria Angelica Naranjo, Janneke Pieters, and Francisco Alpízar 
Abstract 
To cope with losses from extreme hydro-meteorological events, governments typically 
implement disaster relief programs and offer debt relief to affected parties. Governments in 
developing countries have made extensive use of total and partial debt coverage as a way to 
encourage investment in key sectors and in agriculture in particular. In the context of climate 
change, such practices are not viable because risk is systemic and losses can easily surpass 
most governments’ debt relief budgets. Insurance is an obvious alternative, but insurance 
uptake in developing countries is typically low, and little is known about the interaction 
between investment, insurance, and debt relief programs, which effectively reduce borrowers’ 
liability. This paper examines the effect of farmers’ liability on demand for credit with and 
without insurance. We test predictions of a theoretical model in a lab in the field experiment 
with coffee farmers in Costa Rica. Farmers choose how much to invest in six different settings, 
described on the one hand by whether the loan is insured or not, and on the other by the 
probability that the government provides full debt relief. As expected, uptake of loans with 
insurance is significantly higher than without insurance when farmers are fully liable, and 
insurance is not relevant for investments if debt relief is guaranteed. Interestingly, uncertainty 
about liability is enough to trigger the uptake of insured debt. Our results suggest that well-
defined rules for disaster relief are needed to support development of insurance markets. 
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Credit, Insurance and Farmers’ Liability:  
Evidence from a Lab in the Field Experiment with  
Coffee Farmers in Costa Rica 
Maria Angelica Naranjo, Janneke Pieters, and Francisco Alpízar 
1. Introduction 
To cope with losses from extreme hydro-meteorological events, governments 
typically implement disaster relief programs and offer debt relief to affected parties (The 
World Bank 2007). For example, agricultural banks in developing countries frequently 
cooperate with poor agricultural borrowers after they experience a significant loss, 
restructuring their loans, and sometimes outright cancelling outstanding debts (Carter et 
al. 2007). However, governments in general and in developing countries in particular 
have a limited capacity to help. Moreover, in the context of climate change, debt relief 
practices are becoming less viable because risk is systemic and losses can easily surpass 
most governments’ debt relief budgets. An example of systemic risk is exposure to 
increasingly frequent, extreme hydro-meteorological events, as predicted under climate 
change scenarios for Central America.1 Insurance is an obvious alternative, but insurance 
uptake in developing countries is typically low, and little is known about the interaction 
between investment, insurance, and debt relief programs, which effectively reduce 
borrowers’ liability. 
Previous research has focused on the combined effects of credit and insurance on 
investment, and the effects of insurance on credit demand and vice versa.2 Experimental 
evidence, however, is mixed. When combining credit and insurance, some studies find 
credit with insurance increases investment (i.e., fertilizer purchase) (Hill and Viceisza 
                                                 
 Maria Angelica Naranjo (corresponding author: mnaranjo@catie.ac.cr), Economics and Environment for 
Development Research Program, Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE), 
Turrialba, Costa Rica and Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, Netherlands. Janneke 
Pieters, Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, Netherlands. Francisco Alpízar, 
Economics and Environment for Development Research Program, Tropical Agricultural Research and 
Higher Education Center (CATIE), Turrialba, Costa Rica. 
1 It is important to highlight that systemic and highly covariate weather risks can be insured; see Carter et 
al. (2014) for a review on index-based weather insurance for developing countries.  
2 See Marr et al. (2016) for a review of the most recent literature on index insurance and bundling insurance 
with credit. 
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2012), while others find that mandatory insurance actually reduces the demand for credit 
(Giné and Yang 2009) or has no effect on investment and adoption of new technologies 
(Brick and Visser 2015). Finally, Karlan et al. (2014) state that crop insurance alone 
increases farm investment, but when insurance is bundled with credit, it does not 
necessarily increase investment.  
One would expect that governmental debt relief programs are closely linked to the 
uptake of insurance, since debt relief programs affects farmers’ (perceived) liability. 
However, empirical evidence on how farmers’ individual liability affects the uptake of 
insured credit is scarce. There are studies focusing on joint liability3 and credit (Ghatak 
and Guinnane 1999; Chowdhury 2005) and, more recently, on adding collateral 
requirements to joint liability group lending (Flatnes and Carter 2015). Only Giné and 
Yang (2009) refer to the existence of limited liability as a possible explanation for lower 
demand for insured loans compared to uninsured loans. In their model, limited liability 
provides implicit insurance; thus, when an insurance premium must be paid, this results 
in a lower demand for loans. Conversely, when farmers are fully liable or face 
uncertainty about their liability, demand for loans with insurance should increase. 
Our objective is to examine the effect of farmers’ liability on the uptake of credit 
with and without mandatory insurance. We believe this is the first empirical study to 
address this question. We develop a theoretical model, following Giné and Yang (2009), 
and conduct a lab in the field experiment with coffee farmers in Costa Rica. Each farmer 
chooses how much to borrow in order to invest in his farm. Credit is offered either with 
or without mandatory insurance with a premium cost, under three types of government 
debt relief scenarios. Under these scenarios, farmers have limited liability, uncertainty 
about their liability, or full liability. A laboratory approach allows us to isolate the impact 
of limited liability on the demand for loans with and without mandatory insurance. To 
avoid other factors that are likely determinants of insurance uptake, our design takes into 
account an actuarially fairly priced insurance premium, with pay-out triggered by weather 
realization and without any basis risk. 
Our results show uptake of loans with insurance is significantly higher than 
without insurance when farmers are fully liable, but also when there is uncertainty about 
their liability. Yet insurance has no effect on credit demand if debt relief is guaranteed. In 
other words, if a government wants to increase the uptake of insurance as a strategy to 
                                                 
3 Joint liability is when borrowers receive individual loans but form a group in which all members are 
mutually responsible for the total repayment to the lender (Flatnes and Carter 2015). 
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reduce the vulnerability of farmers to climate change, it does not have to go to full 
liability, a very hard to sell public policy and one with hard consequences for the 
agricultural sector. Our results show already high levels of insured investment in a 
scenario in which governmental debt relief is uncertain. Through debt relief programs, 
governments in developing countries have accustomed farmers to enjoy limited liability. 
In reality, though, there is always uncertainty about the level of governmental resources, 
and hence about the level of liability that a farmer faces. Our results show that clearly and 
credibly communicating this level of uncertainty can result in increased uptake of insured 
credit and hence in farmers being better covered against risk.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the 
literature on credit constraints, credit combined with insurance, and the role of limited 
liability; the third section presents a model on credit, investment and insurance, and 
develops our hypotheses; section four describes our experimental design and 
implementation procedures; section five presents the results; and the last section 
concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review  
In this section, we briefly review the relevant literature on credit market 
imperfections. We then discuss previous evidence on bundling credit with mandatory 
insurance and the effects on farm investment. Finally, we reflect on the role of limited 
liability. 
Rural households in developing countries face a number of credit constraints and 
market imperfections that shape investment decisions (Karlan et al. 2014). In the absence 
of insurance markets, “risk rationing,” as explained by Boucher et al. (2008), suggests 
that the borrower voluntarily withdraws from taking a loan, due to the risk of losing 
collateral (Giné and Yang 2009). Traditional formal insurance instruments can be used to 
manage risks, but such insurance services are basically non-existent in rural areas of 
developing countries (Carter et al. 2014). This lack of insurance markets might aggravate 
the effect of risk rationing on credit uptake (Boucher et al. 2008; Giné and Yang 2009). 
The combination of credit and crop insurance, therefore, could be applied as a 
mechanism to improve credit markets and encourage investment in the agricultural sector 
(Carter et al. 2014). 
Some studies focus on bundling credit with mandatory insurance and the effects 
on risk rationality and farm investment. Regarding risk rationality, Cheng (2014) studies 
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the effects of index insurance on risk rationed households in China. In his experiment, 
providing insurance to risk rationed farmers induced more than half of the farmers to 
apply for credit, with approximately two-thirds using the loan for productive investment 
rather than for consumption. Regarding farm investment, Carter et al. (2016) formally 
model and analyze the conditions under which index-based crop insurance can be most 
effective. They show that insurance will have no impact on investment and technology 
adoption when risk is very low and the risk is covered by low collateral or limited 
liability contracts. When collateral requirements are low, index insurance has low impact, 
given the implicit insurance of the loan contracts. Insurance also has low impact under 
high-risk scenarios, when risk aversion reduces adoption and especially when the 
insurance contract carries high basis risk. For index insurance to have an impact on 
investment and credit demand, the risk of suffering losses should be high and covariate 
among farmers. Then the impact of the insurance will depend strongly on the collateral 
requirements by the lender. Under low collateral requirements, bundling credit and 
insurance will foremost benefit the lenders by bringing stability to the loan portfolio. In 
high collateral situations, even stand-alone index insurance, can considerably increase the 
adoption of new technologies through credit when the risk is covered by a well-designed 
index contract (Carter et al. 2016).  
In an experimental study on the importance of capital constraints and uninsured 
risk, Karlan et al. (2014) examine if financial market imperfections discourage 
investment by smallholder farmers. They applied a randomized controlled trial with cash 
grants, rainfall insurance grants, and rainfall insurance sales in northern Ghana. They find 
strong responses of agricultural investment to the rainfall insurance grant, but relatively 
small effects of the cash grants. Hence, uninsured risk limits farmer investment, while 
farmers with insurance grants manage to find resources to increase investment on their 
farms. This clearly suggests that agricultural credit market policy alone is not sufficient to 
increase investment in the agricultural sector. 
Brick and Visser (2015) used a lab in the field experiment in South Africa to 
examine whether provision of index insurance induces farmers to opt for riskier 
activities. They find that providing a loan with insurance does not increase investment in 
new technologies. Furthermore, risk-averse farmers are more likely to opt for traditional 
seeds than for high-yield seeds, regardless of the presence of insurance. Their 
experimental design reflects the reality of an index insurance product that minimizes the 
risk of rainfall variability, but the design does not account for other risk factors (i.e., basis 
risk) that might have affected their results given the high degree of risk aversion. 
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Giné and Yang (2009) implemented a random field experiment in Malawi to 
examine whether production risk suppresses the demand for credit. They offered credit to 
purchase high-yielding seeds to a control group of farmers and credit bundled with index 
insurance to a treatment group. Their results show that take-up is lower when credit is 
bundled with insurance. They argue, and show theoretically, that limited liability 
provides enough implicit insurance, so farmers will prefer loans without mandatory 
insurance, which are less costly.  
To summarize, existing experimental evidence is mixed. On the one hand, 
providing crop insurance increases farm investments (Hill and Viceisza 2012; Karlan et 
al. 2014; Elabed and Carter 2014). On the other hand, when credit and insurance are 
combined, investment does not necessarily increase (Karlan et al. 2014; Brick and Visser 
2015) and may even decline (Giné and Yang 2009).  
We now turn to a more extensive review of the role of limited liability. When 
production is low, farmers may be forced to default to maintain a subsistence level of 
consumption (Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega 2011). Default can occur involuntarily when 
associated with shocks or other risks that make borrowers unable to repay, but can be 
voluntary when lack of contract enforcement incentivizes borrowers to default even when 
they have the means to repay their loans (Ghosh et al. 2000). When contracts are subject 
to limited liability, borrowers are not forced to repay the bank if returns on investment are 
less than loan repayment obligations (Ghosh et al. 2000).  
Agricultural banks and governments in developing countries often cooperate with 
poor agricultural borrowers to deal with losses from extreme events, by restructuring 
loans and through debt relief programs (Carter et al. 2007). Governmental assistance, 
however, is not always certain, making farmers more or less liable in the process 
(Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega 2011; Carter et al. 2007). After the strong effects of “El 
Niño” 1998 in Peru, for example, a government decree forced lenders to reschedule, 
meaning that farmers in default could pay later. Lenders believed these public sector 
interventions damaged the credit culture that had been formed in previous years (Trivelli 
et al. 2006). In Costa Rica, the government applied debt relief six times between 2004 
and 2012, to assist borrowers who had received credit from development banks and were 
struggling to repay their loans (Gutierrez-Vargas 2015). To illustrate the impact of 
restructuring loans on farmers’ behavior, simulations show that borrowers increase 
repayment of loans when payment to the bank is reduced, but they default in the period 
after receiving the loan; this moral hazard effect reduces banks’ returns (Miranda and 
Gonzalez-Vega 2010). 
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Empirical evidence on the effect of farmers’ liability on uptake of credit 
combined with insurance is scarce. Only Giné and Yang (2009) refer to the existence of 
limited liability as a possible explanation for lower credit demand when credit is bundled 
with insurance. They show theoretically that a loan contract with limited liability 
provides enough implicit insurance, and therefore credit demand will decline with 
mandatory insurance that increases the price of credit (Giné and Yang 2009). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that farmers’ belief about availability of disaster relief is 
associated with less participation in insurance programs. 
A study by van Asseldonk et al. (2002) explore the producer’s belief in disaster 
relief in the Netherlands. Farmers’ willingness to pay to participate in a hypothetical 
insurance program is negatively and significantly associated with the producer’s belief 
that disaster relief will be available in the future. In addition, a recent study by Deryugina 
and Kirwan (2016) hypothesizes a similar pattern by estimating whether the Samaritan’s 
dilemma exists in U.S. agriculture.4 They instrument for disaster payments using political 
variation at county level and then estimate how expectations of receiving these payments 
affect farmers’ decisions. They find that bailout expectations reduce crop insurance 
coverage by reducing expenditures on premiums and inducing farmers to choose less 
generous insurance plans. At the same time, farmers also reduce farm labor and fertilizer 
use.  
The next section will discuss in detail the theory behind farmers’ decision-making 
regarding loans. 
3. Theoretical Model 
This section describes the theoretical model for credit demand and insurance, 
building on the model developed by Giné and Yang (2009). We start with the general 
model setup and then illustrate the simple case of loans without insurance, followed by 
the case of loans with mandatory insurance. Finally, we introduce differences in farmers’ 
liability and discuss the hypotheses. 
                                                 
4 First described by Buchanan (1975), the Samaritan’s dilemma explain how individuals who expect to be 
bailed out in times of crisis (e.g., natural disasters and financial crises) take on additional risk in response 
(Deryugina and Kirwan 2016). 
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3.1. General Model Setup 
To analyze farmers’ demand for credit, we consider a risk-averse farmer who is 
offered credit under two types of contract (with and without mandatory weather 
insurance) and three types of government debt relief (limited liability, uncertainty about 
liability, or full liability for farmers). Farmers use the credit to invest in their agricultural 
production. Farm output depends on the level of investment, the return on investment, 
and the state of the weather. We define p and (1-p) as the probability of good (bad) 
weather. Following Giné and Yang (2009), we assume perfect correlation of investment 
returns and state of the weather, so that investment returns depend solely on the 
realization of the weather with a probability p = ½. 
Without investment, farmers can realize a base output level  𝑌𝐵 in case of bad 
weather or  𝑌𝐵 + 𝑎 in case of good weather, while investment will increase output to the 
level 𝑌𝐻 in case of good weather and reduce output to the level 𝑌𝐿 in case of bad weather.
5 
We assume that expected output is higher when the farmer invests than without 
investment, so that  𝑝 (𝑌𝐵 + 𝑎)  +  (1 − 𝑝)𝑌𝐵 < 𝑝 𝑌𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑌𝐿. 
Output with investment, YH or YL, depends on the amount invested, which is equal 
to the loan size C. In case the weather is good, investment gives the farmer a positive 
return r, so that YH = Yb + a + rC. In case of bad weather, the return is negative r, so that 
YL = Yb – rC.  
We define 𝑖 as the interest rate, 𝑊 as the value of famers’ assets required as 
collateral for a loan of any given size, and R as the repayment of the loan, consisting of 
the amount borrowed and the interest due. We assume that the value of the collateral is 
enough to cover the repayment of the loan: 𝑊 > (1 + 𝑖)𝐶 = 𝑅, and that output in the low 
state is not sufficient to repay the bank (𝑌𝐿 < 𝑅). The lender can always seize up to the 
full value of farm output YL or YH in order to secure repayment of the loan, but only 
seizes other assets 𝑊 with a probability ϕ. The three scenarios we analyze are limited 
liability (ϕ = 0 ), uncertain liability (0 < ϕ < 1), and full liability (ϕ = 1). 
                                                 
5 We give farmers the example of investing in new coffee trees (see Annex 2), when indeed a bad weather 
shock can lead to negative returns on investment. 
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3.2. Credit Without Insurance 
First, consider the case when credit is offered without insurance and farmers 
decide whether to borrow and invest amount C. When the farmer chooses not to invest, 
expected utility is defined as 
𝑈𝐵 =  
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐵 + 𝑎 + 𝑊) + 
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐵 + 𝑊) (1) 
When the farmer chooses to invest, output can be high or low, depending on the 
weather. Consumption in the high output state is 𝑐𝐻 =  𝑌𝐻 − 𝑅 + 𝑊. In the low output 
state, consumption depends on whether the bank seizes (part of) the collateral to recover 
repayment, which it does with probability ϕ. Hence, expected utility with investment in 
the case of credit without insurance is given by: 
𝑈𝑈 =  
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐻 − 𝑅 + 𝑊) +
1
2
[𝜙 𝑢(𝑌𝐿 − 𝑅 + 𝑊) + (1 − 𝜙)𝑢(𝑊) ] (2) 
3.3. Credit With Mandatory Insurance 
Second, consider the case when credit is offered only in combination with 
weather insurance provided by the bank. The insurance premium 𝜋 is set at an actuarially 
fair price (following Giné and Yang 2009), so that, in order to invest level 𝐶, farmers 
need to borrow an amount 𝐶 + 𝜋. The total repayment to the bank for a loan with 
insurance is therefore 𝑅𝐼 = (1 + 𝑖)(𝐶 + 𝜋). In states of bad weather, the insurance pays 
out the total amount  𝑅𝐼. Given the actuarially fairly priced insurance, the premium can 
be written as a function of repayment without insurance (as in Giné and Yang 2009), 
which gives 𝑅𝐼 =  
𝑅
p
= 2𝑅. Hence, expected utility of investment when credit is 
combined with insurance is: 
𝑈𝐼 =  
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐻 − 2𝑅 + 𝑊) +  
1
2
 𝑢(𝑌𝐿 + 𝑊)  (3) 
3.4. Differences in Farmers’ Liability 
We evaluate three different liability scenarios: limited liability (ϕ = 0), uncertain 
liability (ϕ =
1
2
), and full liability (ϕ = 1). In general, utility of credit demand with 
actuarially fairly priced insurance depends on the level of output in case of bad 
weather, YL, and on farmers’ risk aversion. In the next section, we use a constant relative 
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risk aversion utility function (CRRA)6 and show the predictions of the theoretical model 
under the distinct features of our experimental design.  
Intuitively, when farmers have limited liability and income in the low state is 
lower than repayment with insurance YL < R, loans without insurance should provide 
sufficient implicit insurance. Thus, utility of uninsured credit should be higher than utility 
of insured credit. Then, when farmers are uncertain about their liability or are fully liable, 
low values of 𝑌𝐿 and a contract without insurance still provide implicit insurance and thus 
higher expected utility for uninsured loans. However, when 𝑌𝐿 increases, farmers’ default 
costs also increase and expected utility is higher for loans with insurance (Giné and Yang 
2009, p4). Table 1 summarizes expected utility in each of the scenarios, assuming that 
 YL < R and that the coefficient of risk aversion σ = 0.5 . 
Table 1. Expected Utility in Each Experimental Treatment and Testable Hypothesis 
 Limited liability (𝛟 = 𝟎) Uncertain liability (𝛟 =
𝟏
𝟐
) Full liability (𝛟 = 𝟏) 
Credit 
without 
insurance 
(UU) 
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐻 − 𝑅 + 𝑊) +  
1
2
𝑢(𝑊) 
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐻 − 𝑅 + 𝑊) +
1
2
[
1
2
 𝑢(𝑌𝐿 − 𝑅 + 𝑊)
+
1
2
𝑢(𝑊) ] 
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐻 − 𝑅 + 𝑊) +
1
2
u(𝒀𝑳 − 𝑅
+ 𝑊) 
Credit with  
insurance (UI) 
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐻 − 2𝑅 + 𝑊) +  
1
2
𝑢(𝒀𝑳
+ 𝑊) 
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐻 − 2𝑅 + 𝑊) +  
1
2
𝑢(𝒀𝑳 + 𝑊) 
1
2
𝑢(𝑌𝐻 − 2𝑅 + 𝑊) +  
1
2
𝑢(𝒀𝑳 + 𝑊) 
Testable 
hypothesis 
𝑈𝑈 ≻  𝑈𝐼   𝑈𝑈 ≺  𝑈𝐼  𝑈𝑈 ≺  𝑈𝐼  
Note: Expected utility based on the model outlined in the main text, when  YL < R and σ = 0.5. 
4. Experimental Design and Implementation 
To test our hypotheses in a controlled environment, we implemented a lab in the 
field experiment with coffee farmers in Costa Rica. The experiment is set up as a within-
subject design in which each farmer faces six different treatments. In each treatment, the 
farmer chooses how much to borrow for investment in her farm, while facing ex-ante 
uncertainty about the weather, which can be good or bad. In the treatments, credit is 
offered either with or without mandatory insurance, and with farmers having limited 
liability (ϕ = 0), uncertainty about their liability (ϕ = ½), or full liability (ϕ = 1). We explain 
that farmers’ liability is the result of whether or not there will be debt relief by the 
government in case of bad weather. Each treatment is presented as a one-period decision 
making game, independent from the other treatments. 
                                                 
6 Constant relative risk aversion utility function: u(c) =  
c 1−σ
1−σ
;  0 < σ < 1. σ = 0 indicates risk neutrality 
and σ > 0 indicates risk aversion. 
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The experimental design is developed in line with the previous model, in which 
good and bad weather occur with equal probability (𝑝 =  ½ ) and we assume a CRRA 
risk aversion parameter (𝜎 = ½). Base output (without any investment) is Yb = 2 in case 
of bad weather, while good weather will result in additional output over base output equal 
to a = 1 (Hill and Viceisza 2012). Farmers can choose to invest zero, one or two units of 
capital C. If the weather is good, investment gives the farmer a positive return over the 
capital (r = 5): YH = Yb + a + rC. In case of bad weather, the return is negative (r = -1) 
and: YL = Yb – C.  
In each of the six treatments, farmers are given an endowment (W = 3) that can 
serve as collateral. This endowment is sufficient to guarantee the maximum uninsured 
repayment amount (W > R), with the interest rate fixed at i =0.10 throughout the 
experiment. Farmers are told that their asset endowment can be seen as farmland, 
housing, or other properties that the lender can take in case of default. Farmers’ 
consumption will depend on the amount invested C, the weather draw, and whether or not 
their collateral is seized by the bank. One unit of income or consumption in the 
experiment is set equal to 1,000 Costa Rican Colones (CRC).7 
Figure 1 shows expected utility without credit (zero investment) and with 
maximum investment (C=2), with or without insurance, for different risk aversion 
parameter values and while holding the expected returns constant. As Figure 1 shows, for 
low levels of risk aversion, the expected utility associated with maximum investment is 
always higher than the expected utility without investment, whether or not credit comes 
with insurance. 
                                                 
7 1000 CRC equals approximately two US dollars.  
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Figure 1. Expected CRRA Utility Varying the Risk Aversion Parameter 
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When risk aversion increases, maximum investment is still preferred in the case 
of limited liability (top panel), except for very high levels of risk aversion, where no 
differences are clearly displayed. When farmers are uncertain about their liability (middle 
panel), maximum investment is still preferred over no investment if credit is bundled with 
insurance. If credit is uninsured, the very risk-averse farmers are indifferent between 
maximum investment and no investment. Finally, when farmers are fully liable (bottom 
panel) and risk aversion increases above 0.4, they prefer zero investment over uninsured 
investment. 
Farmers in our experiment choose their level of credit under each type of loan 
(insured or uninsured) and liability scenario, rather than choosing between an insured and 
uninsured loan. Hence, our theoretical model predicts that, when farmers have limited 
liability, credit demand should be higher if credit is not bundled with insurance than if 
credit is bundled with insurance. When farmers are uncertain about their liability and 
have relatively low risk aversion, credit demand should also be higher if credit is not 
bundled with insurance. With uncertain liability and high levels of risk aversion, credit 
demand should be higher if credit is bundled with insurance. When farmers are fully 
liable, credit demand should be higher if credit is bundled with insurance. In the same 
scenario, for risk aversion below 0.45, expected utility without insurance is still higher 
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than without investment, but, for risk aversion above 0.45, the expected utility of not 
investing is higher than that of investing without insurance.  
Each of the six treatments was repeated three times to be able to perform several 
robustness tests. We explain that rounds are independent from each other, and that one 
round will be randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. The draw of 
the round for payment and weather is determined in private for each farmer. Selection of 
the payment round was done by taking one chip out of a bag with 18 chips numbered 1-
18, while the weather draw was determined with the toss of a coin. Final payment 
consisted of a show-up fee of 2000 CRC plus the level of consumption the farmer 
reached in the selected round. Detailed instructions are included in the complete 
experimental protocol in Annex 4. 
Farmers participating in the experiment were selected from two coffee regions, 
Perez Zeledon and Los Santos, using stratified random sampling according to the density 
of coffee plots. Regions were selected to capture the variety in altitude and effects of a 
coffee rust epidemic in 2012-13; all farmers were surveyed in 2014 as part of a different 
study (Alpízar et al. 2016). We contacted all surveyed farmers and conducted thirteen 
experimental sessions at local primary schools during the second and third week of 
October 2015.8 Sessions were organized one per day during the afternoon, with on 
average 10 farmers per session, who were assigned randomly to individual desks around 
the classroom. The order of treatments was selected randomly in the first two sessions, 
and repeated in subsequent sessions. 
In total, 134 (46 percent of the 2014 survey participants) farmers participated in 
the experiment. Two farmers had incomplete responses for the experiment; these are 
excluded from the analyses. Table 2 presents farmers’ characteristics for the survey and 
experimental participants. Differences in means (t-test) show no differences between the 
two groups for most of the variables, except that farmers participating in the experimental 
sessions have on average a smaller total area planted with coffee. We show in the next 
section that this has no effect on the outcomes of the experiment. Hence, our results can 
be seen as representative for the two coffee regions. 
 
                                                 
8 Farmers were offered two possible dates to attend a workshop session at two nearby villages. 
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Table 2. Variables and Sample Means for Survey and Experimental Sample 
 Survey 
2014 
Experiment 
 2015 
t-test 
 
n Mean n Mean Difference p-value 
Age (years) 294 51.76 132 51.52 0.25 0.828 
Women 294 0.10 132 0.11 -0.01 0.783 
Education (years) 294 5.79 132 5.79 0.00 0.993 
Region (% from Perez Zeledon) 294 0.47 132 0.39 0.08* 0.053 
% income from coffee 279 56.94 126 57.83 -0.89 0.780 
Total coffee area (ha) 294 3.48 132 2.53 0.96*** 0.000 
Affected by leaf rust 294 0.81 132 0.81 0.00 0.975 
Source: (Alpízar et al. 2016). Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5. Empirical Strategy and Results 
To analyze the effect of farmers’ liability on demand for credit with and without 
insurance, our main dependent variable is the average amount borrowed across the three 
repeated rounds within each treatment. Figure 2 presents the distribution of farmers’ 
credit demand across the six experimental treatments. Credit demand varies considerably 
across treatments. Farmers are more likely to demand the highest level of credit (2000 
CRC) when governmental debt relief ensures limited liability for the two types of loans, 
with insurance (52 percent) and without insurance (58 percent). Comparing Figures 2a 
and 2b, there appears to be little impact of mandatory insurance on farmers’ credit 
demand when farmers are not liable, in line with theoretical predictions (see Figure 1). 
Compared to limited liability, credit demand is lower when farmers are uncertain about 
their liability and especially when they are fully liable. Comparing Figures 2c and 2d, as 
well as Figures 2e and 2f, we see that, with uncertain or full liability, mandatory 
insurance increases demand for credit. Again, this is in line with predictions from the 
model, and suggests the farmers in our sample have intermediate to high levels of risk 
aversion. 
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Figure 2. Credit Demand by Treatment 
2a. Loan without insurance and limited liability 2b. Loan with insurance and limited liability 
  
2c. Loan without insurance and uncertain liability 2d. Loan with insurance and uncertain liability 
  
2e. Loan without insurance and full liability 2f. Loan with insurance and full liability 
  
Table 3 and Figure 3 explore differences in means between treatments using a 
paired t-test. Comparing means across the rows of Table 4 again shows that liability 
decreases total credit demand. We also confirm that uptake of loans with insurance is 
significantly higher than without insurance when farmers are liable or when there is 
uncertainty about their liability. We find no significant differences between demand for 
loans with and without insurance in case of limited liability. 
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Table 3. Paired t-test for Differences in Credit Demand Means Across Treatments 
 Without insurance With insurance t-test N 
 Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error Difference p-value  
Limited liability 1.39 0.053 1.36 0.052 -0.03 0.593 132 
Uncertainty 0.62 0.050 1.14 0.052 0.53*** 0.000 132 
Full liability 0.51 0.051 0.96 0.053 0.45*** 0.000 132 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Figure 3. Differences in Credit Demand Across Treatments 
 
To formally analyze the effect of mandatory insurance and liability, we estimate 
the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 +  𝛽2 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘
+ 𝛽3  𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙_𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘  +  𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗  × 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘
+ 𝛽5  𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗  × 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙_𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 +  𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗  (4) 
Our dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the average amount borrowed by farmer i in 
insurance treatment j and under liability treatment k, γi are farmer fixed effects, and εij is 
the error term. The average amount borrowed is measured as the average of all three 
rounds within a treatment. The treatment with no insurance and limited liability is taken 
as the reference. Standard errors are clustered by farmer.  
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Table 4. Impact of Insurance and Liability on Credit Demand 
Dependent variable: average amount borrowed 
 Full sample 
First round 
per treatment 
dropped 
Subsample 
treatment 
order 1 
Subsample 
treatment 
order 2 
       
Insurance -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 
 [0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.08] 
     
Uncertain liability -0.77*** -0.83*** -0.88*** -0.66*** 
 [0.06] [0.07] [0.08] [0.09] 
Full liability -0.88*** -0.95*** -0.97*** -0.79*** 
 [0.06] [0.07] [0.08] [0.10] 
 
Insurance * Uncertain liability 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.58*** 0.52*** 
 [0.06] [0.07] [0.09] [0.09] 
Insurance * Full liability 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.43*** 
 [0.06] [0.07] [0.09] [0.08] 
     
Constant 1.39*** 1.41*** 1.41*** 1.38*** 
 [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] 
     
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Mean dependent variable 1.38 1.41 1.39 1.36 
Observations 792 792 414 378 
R-squared within subjects 0.417 0.385 0.487 0.348 
Number of subjects 132 132 69 63 
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
In Table 4, the first column shows that the introduction of mandatory insurance 
has no significant effect on credit demand when liability is limited. This is not surprising, 
and confirms the reality of developing countries, where limited liability is ubiquitous and 
insurance virtually nonexistent. On the other hand, the coefficients on the interaction 
terms show that, when there is uncertainty about liability or full liability, the effect of 
mandatory insurance is positive and highly significant. Moreover, the effect is large: 
insurance increases credit demand by around 0.5 (or 500 CRC), which is more than one-
third of the sample average (1.38), and close to one standard deviation (0.60).  
We perform a number of robustness checks. First, we drop the first observation of 
each round, as this may be considered a practice round, after which farmers are better 
able to determine their preferred level of credit. Hence, the dependent variable is the 
average amount borrowed across the second and third round of the respective treatment 
(results in the second column of Table 4). Second, to ensure results are not driven by the 
order of the rounds in the experiment, we split the sample according to the order of 
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treatments: each session followed one of two possible (randomly determined) treatment 
orders, so we analyze whether results differ between the two groups of experiment 
sessions (third and fourth columns of Table 4). In all estimations, we find very similar 
results. 
5.1. Heterogeneous Treatment Effect 
In this section, we present results for heterogeneous effects of treatment. We start 
with verifying whether treatment effects depend on farmers’ total area planted with 
coffee. Recall from Table 2 that coffee area is significantly smaller for famers in the 
experiment sample, compared to the total random sample of farmers that were invited to 
participate. Results in Table 5 show there are no differences by farmers’ total coffee area. 
This suggests our results are representative of farmers in the two regions, even though 
our sample is not representative in terms of coffee area planted. 
Table 5. Heterogeneous Effects for Coffee Area  
 Dependent variable: average amount borrowed (1) 
Insurance -0.06 
 [0.07] 
Uncertain liability -0.70*** 
 [0.08] 
Full liability -0.77*** 
 [0.09] 
Insurance*Uncertain liability 0.52*** 
 [0.09] 
Insurance*Full liability 0.46*** 
 [0.09] 
  
Coffee area*Insurance 0.01 
 [0.02] 
Coffee area*Uncertain liability -0.03 
 [0.02] 
Coffee area*Full liability -0.04* 
 [0.02] 
Coffee area*Insurance*Uncertain liability 0.01 
 [0.02] 
Coffee area*Insurance*Full liability 0.01 
 [0.02] 
  
Fix effects Y 
Mean dependent variable 1.38 
Observations 792 
R-squared with-in subjects 0.425 
Number of subjects 132 
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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We analyze other heterogeneous effects across farmers’ social and financial 
indicators (Annex 1). Evidence from previous studies suggests there is a positive 
relationship between credit take-up and farmer’s education and income (Giné and Yang 
2009), and that previous exposure to weather shocks can affect the take-up of credit 
bundled with insurance (Hill and Viceisza 2012). We analyze heterogeneity by farmers’ 
age, gender, years of schooling, percentage of income coming from coffee harvest, and 
having been affected by other shocks in the past, including their experience with the 
recent coffee leaf rust epidemic in 2012-13. However, we do not find significant effects 
of these variables in interaction with treatments (Annex 1, Table A1). 
We believe that our lab in the field experiment design was well-explained and 
easier to understand for farmers, compared to other field experiments evaluating existing 
insurance programs. Existing insurance schemes can carry basis risk and trust concerns 
due to lack of information, which can lead to differences based on education, income, and 
previous experience with shocks. Furthermore, our experimental sample and the farmers’ 
population in general is very homogeneous in their socioeconomic characteristics. 
Therefore, we don’t have sufficient variability in the data to find significant 
heterogeneous effects. 
6. Conclusions 
Governments in developing countries have made extensive use of total and partial 
debt relief as a way to encourage investment in key sectors and in agriculture in 
particular. In a context of climate change, such practices are most likely not viable 
because risk is systemic and losses can easily surpass most governments’ debt relief 
budgets. Insurance is an obvious alternative, but what is the interaction between 
insurance and debt relief programs?  
We test the predictions by Giné and Yang (2009) that insurance will not increase 
credit demand if farmers are not liable. Using their conceptual model, we explore the 
effect on the credit demand of interacting mandatory insurance with different degrees of 
liability. The model is tested using a lab in the field experiment with coffee farmers in 
Costa Rica. 
Our results show that uptake of loans bundled with insurance is significantly 
higher than uptake of loans that are not bundled with insurance, both when farmers are 
fully liable and when there is uncertainty about their liability. Yet, insurance has no effect 
on credit demand if debt relief is guaranteed. In other words, if a government wants to 
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increase the uptake of insurance as a strategy to reduce the vulnerability of farmers to 
climate change, it does not have to impose full liability, a very hard to sell public policy 
and one with hard consequences for the agricultural sector. Our results show already high 
levels of insured investment in a scenario in which governmental debt relief is uncertain. 
Through debt relief programs, governments in developing countries have accustomed 
farmers to enjoying limited liability. In reality, though, there is always uncertainty about 
the level of governmental resources, and hence about the level of liability that a farmer 
faces. Our results show that clearly and credibly communicating this level of uncertainty 
can result in increased uptake of insured credit and hence in farmers being better covered 
against risk. 
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Annex 1. Additional Results 
Table A1. Heterogeneous Effects by Farmers’ Characteristics 
Dependent variable: average amount borrowed (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Insurance 0.18 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 
 [0.20] [0.05] [0.15] [0.11] [0.13] 
Uncertainty -1.33*** -0.77*** -0.47*** -0.70*** -0.94*** 
 [0.22] [0.06] [0.14] [0.11] [0.12] 
Full liability -1.85*** -0.89*** -0.51*** -0.75*** -1.00*** 
 [0.23] [0.06] [0.16] [0.13] [0.14] 
Insurance*Uncertain liability 0.47* 0.57*** 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.64*** 
 [0.25] [0.06] [0.15] [0.13] [0.17] 
Insurance*Full liability 0.82*** 0.48*** 0.27* 0.33*** 0.43*** 
 [0.23] [0.06] [0.15] [0.12] [0.14] 
      
Age*insurance -0.00     
 [0.00]     
Age*Uncertain liability 0.01**     
 [0.00]     
Age*Full liability 0.02***     
 [0.00]     
Age*Insurance*Uncertain liability 0.00     
 [0.00]     
Age*Insurance*Full liability -0.01     
 [0.00]     
      
Female*Insurance  0.06    
  [0.20]    
Women* Uncertain liability  -0.04    
  [0.26]    
Women*Full liability  0.03    
  [0.24]    
Women*Insurance*Uncertain liability  -0.17    
  [0.25]    
Women*Insurance*Full liability  0.02    
  [0.24]    
      
Schooling1*Insurance   0.01   
   [0.03]   
Schooling* Uncertain liability   -0.05**   
   [0.02]   
Schooling*Full liability   -0.07**   
   [0.03]   
Schooling *Insurance*Uncertain liability   -0.00   
   [0.02]   
Schooling *Insurance*Full liability   0.04   
   [0.02]   
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Dependent variable: average amount borrowed (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Income2*Insurance    -0.00  
    [0.00]  
Income* Uncertain liability    -0.00  
    [0.00]  
Income*Full liability    -0.00  
    [0.00]  
Income*Insurance*Uncertain liability    0.00  
    [0.00]  
Income*Insurance*Full liability    0.00  
    [0.00]  
      
Shocks3*Insurance     -0.02 
     [0.14] 
Shocks* Uncertain liability     0.21 
     [0.14] 
Shocks*Full liability     0.14 
     [0.16] 
Shocks*Insurance* Uncertain liability     -0.10 
     [0.19] 
Shocks*Insurance*Full liability     0.06 
     [0.16] 
      
Constant 1.39*** 1.39*** 1.39*** 1.39*** 1.39*** 
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] 
      
Fix effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Mean dependent variable 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 
Observations 792 792 792 756 792 
R-squared within subjects 0.451 0.420 0.438 0.411 0.421 
Number of subjects 132 132 132 126 132 
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1 Years of schooling. 
2 Percentage of the total household income coming from coffee farming. 
3 Dummy variable of being affected by shocks in the past including their experience with the recent coffee 
leaf rust epidemic in 2012-13. 
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Annex 2. General Experimental Instructions 
 
I. Welcome procedures 
 
1. Meet people at door; request ID. 
2. Match ID with survey ID. 
3. Write the ID survey number in the decision sheet booklet. 
4. Give them the closed decision sheet booklet. Stress that they can’t open the 
booklet until indicated by the coordinator. 
5. Invite them to sit, assigning them randomly across the room. 
 
II. General instructions for farmers and experimenters 
 
[START POWER POINT PRESENTATION] 
 
☼ [Slide 1] Good afternoon. Today you will participate in a decision-making workshop. 
You are invited as a follow-up to a survey conducted last year. The exercises are based on 
real-life decisions that will allow us to learn from your experience, according to the 
decisions made during the workshop. The workshop will last about two hours and we need 
to stay together until the end. At the end of the workshop, you will be compensated with 
real money, the amount of which will depend on the decisions made and on chance. You 
will receive a minimum payment of 2,000 colones, plus the result of your decisions in the 
workshop exercises. 
 
We are going to read the instructions together. First the general instructions and then 
gradually through the decision game rounds. Listen carefully to the instructions for each 
choice. Look carefully at the possible payments and the probabilities associated with each 
choice before making a decision. Remember that your final earnings will depend on the 
decisions you make and on chance.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and I or one of my colleagues will come 
to help you! Please do not hesitate to ask a question if you do not understand. There are 
no right or wrong answers. Your decisions are personal and depend on your own 
preferences. Your decisions are also anonymous. This means the decisions can only be 
yours and your choices will remain private. So, please remain quiet and do not share your 
decisions or talk to the person sitting next to you. This is very important!  
 
[GO THROUGH INSTRUCTIONS WITHOUT INVITING QUESTIONS. AVOID 
PUBLIC QUESTIONS] 
 
☼ [Slide 2] To borrow or not to borrow money from the bank 
 
You choices today consist of deciding whether or not to take a loan to invest in your farm. 
If you decide to invest, just like any loan contract, you must have illiquid assets as a 
guarantee in case you cannot pay the loan. These assets can be your own farmland, house 
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or other properties that are taken by the lender if you can´t pay back what you borrowed.  
 
Since we cannot quantify what you possess, today you all have the same value of wealth 
as a guarantee, equal to 3,000 colones, before you make your decision. 
 
 
☼ [Slide 3] You pay an interest rate 
 
You decide how much to borrow. You can borrow nothing, 1,000, 2,000 or 3,000 colones. 
The decision is yours. Remember there are no right or wrong answers.  
Like any credit, you must pay an interest rate to the Bank. The interest rate is 10% of the 
amount you decide to borrow. This means that, according to the table below, if you decide 
to invest and borrow 1,000 colones from the bank, you have to pay back 1,100 colones. If 
you invest and borrow 2,000 colones, you have to pay back 2,200 colones. If you decide 
not to borrow, then you pay nothing back to the bank. Do you have any questions? 
 
 
 
You invest and borrow You pay back to the bank 
₡0 ₡0 
₡1,000 ₡1,100 
₡2,000 ₡2,200 
 
☼ [Slide 4] Your investment is risky and depends on the weather 
 
Note that the result depends on the weather. For example, consider renewing your farm 
with a new variety of coffee. If things go well and the weather conditions are favorable, 
you get a profit. However, if things go wrong and there is a lack of rain, or a hurricane to 
damage your new coffee plantation, then you will have a much lower output than if you 
had not invested. 
 
The probability of a good or bad result is 50/50. That is, after deciding how much to 
borrow to invest, you have to throw a coin. If the coin marks "Crown," that means there 
will be good weather and if the coin marks "Shield," that means there will be bad weather. 
If you choose not to invest, you will have an output of 3,000 colones if there is good 
weather and production of 2,000 colones if weather conditions are not favorable and 
affect the harvest. 
 
On the other hand, if you decide to borrow and invest, there is a chance that things will 
go well and that you will earn more money, or that things will go badly and you will be 
worse off than without investing. If you borrow and invest 1,000 colones and there is good 
weather, you might get 8,000 colones and if bad weather 1,000 colones. If you borrow and 
invest 2,000 colones and there is good weather, you might get 13,000 colones, and if bad 
weather zero colones. Do you have any questions? 
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You invest and borrow Good weather Bad weather  
₡0 ₡3,000 ₡2,000 
₡1,000 ₡8,000 ₡1,000 
₡2,000 ₡13,000 ₡0 
 
Do you have any questions? [WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY] 
 
☼ [Slide 4] Production + Capital – Payment to the bank 
 
After the good or bad weather determines the outcome of your investment, you will still 
have to pay the Bank according to your loan. Remember that everyone has the same initial 
capital as collateral, which is equal to ₡ 3,000. Therefore, your final output is production 
+ capital – what you have to pay the bank. 
 
   
You invest and 
borrow 
Good weather Bad weather  
₡0 ₡3,000 + ₡3,000 – ₡0 = 
₡6,000 
₡2,000 + 3,000 – ₡0 = 
₡5,000 
₡1.000 ₡8,000 + ₡3,000 – 1,100 = 
₡9,900 
₡1,000 + ₡3,000 – 1,100 = 
₡2,900 
₡2.000 ₡13,000 + ₡3,000 – 2,200 = 
₡13,800 
₡0 +₡3,000 – 2,200 =  
₡800 
 
Any questions? [WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY] 
 
☼ [Slide 5] Weather insurance 
 
Pay attention to the instructions. Sometimes the loan offered is bundled with insurance. 
This means that, when you take the loan, it includes mandatory insurance. The benefits 
from the insurance are that it takes care of repaying the bank when bad weather events 
occur, securing your assets. However, the insurance is costly. Therefore, when the weather 
is good, there is a cost reflected by the amount to repay to the bank.   
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You invest and borrow 
You pay back the bank 
with NO insurance 
You pay back to the bank 
with insurance 
₡0 ₡0 ₡0 
₡1.000 ₡1,100 ₡2,200 
₡2.000 ₡2,200 ₡4,400 
 
Do you have any questions? [WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY] 
☼ [Slide 6] Government help in case of bad weather 
  
Sometimes when a bad weather event occurs, and affects an entire sector, for example 
coffee production, the government takes action to relieve the consequences of the shock. 
In the past, the government has applied debt forgiveness on credit loans when farmers 
affected by shocks can´t pay back the banks. Please pay attention to the instructions, since 
in some rounds the government will apply debt forgiveness when bad weather events occur 
and sometimes it might help according to a probability. Do you have any questions? 
  
[WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY] 
 
Debt forgiveness when bad weather events occur 
 
 No help  You have to pay the bank 
 Debt forgiveness  You don’t have to pay the bank 
 Depends on a probability  
- You have to pay the bank 
- You don’t have to pay the bank 
 
☼ [Slide 7] Payment procedure 
You will take 18 decision tasks. After you have taken all the decisions, one of your decisions 
will be drawn for real payment. This mean the amounts indicated in the decision problem 
will be paid out for real. 
 
At the end of this workshop, one of the 18 decision tasks will be drawn at random by each 
of you, by taking one chip out of this bag with equal probability for each decision task to 
be extracted for payment. You can check that in the bag there will be exactly 18 numbered 
chips, one for each decision previously taken. Then, you will draw a coin to pay you 
according to the good weather or bad weather. Do you have any questions? 
 
[WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY] 
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Annex 3. Example of Decision Sheet 
EXAMPLE 
 
 Credit does not require insurance 
 
 The government cannot help and the Bank will 
seize your properties if no payment 
 
 
POSSIBLE RESULTS 
Amount  
borrowed 
Good  
weather 
Bad 
weather 
Mark your  
answer 
 
 
 
 
₡ 0 ₡ 6,000 ₡ 5,000 
 
₡ 1,000 ₡ 9,900 ₡ 2,900 
 
 ₡ 2,000 ₡ 13,800 ₡ 800 
 
 
